the normative standard needs to be reconsidered. For science that has clear non-epistemic impacts, being "value-free" is not a laudable goal. As I will note at the end of my paper, this does not mean any argument whatsoever is a good argument in science. Accepting the role of values in science does not eliminate the requirement for good arguments. It only modifies the understanding of what can count as a good argument.
It must be noted that this challenge to the normative standard is obviously not the only one set forth recently. In the past ten years, feminist philosophers of science have challenged the normative standard, primarily by challenging the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction on which it rests. (Rooney 1992; Longino 1996) I find their arguments largely persuasive and I have written elsewhere on the porousness of this distinction. (Machamer and Douglas 1999 ) While the distinction cannot do the boundary work many philosophers would like it to (i.e., maintaining the boundary between legitimate uses of values and illegitimate uses that would threaten the objectivity of science), the distinction can serve to remind us which goals the values primarily serve within a particular context. This is how I will use it for the remainder of this paper. 2. Inductive Risk. From 1948 From -1965 , a series of papers3 raised the issue of whether values could be a legitimate part of scientific reasoning. All those 1. By "dioxin" I will be referring to the most toxic congener of the class of chemicals known as dioxins, 2, 3, 7, 3, 7, , which is also the best studied. that argued for the legitimate use of values in science did so on the basis of the concept of inductive risk. Inductive risk, a term first used by Hempel (1965) 4, is the chance that one will be wrong in accepting (or rejecting) a scientific hypothesis. While papers such as Churchman 1948 and Rudner 1953 argued that the risk of inductive error meant that values must play a role in science generally, other papers, such as Jeffrey 1956 and Levi 1962 , sought to limit the influence of non-epistemic values in science. Because Hempel's views encapsulate considerations from both sides of this debate, I will focus on Hempel to introduce the concept of inductive risk.
A more in-depth historical examination of this material must await a future paper. Hempel then considers what rules should be used by a scientist when accepting or rejecting hypotheses, arguing that values do have an important role to play in the rules of acceptance. (1965, 92) Hempel considers rules of acceptance to be "special instances of decision rules" (such as maximizing expected utility), which must consider both the possibility that the decision to accept a hypothesis (or reject a hypothesis) proves right and the possibility that it proves wrong. As Hempel states:
When a scientific rule of acceptance is applied to a specified hypothesis on the basis of a given body of evidence, the possible 'outcomes' of the resulting decision may be divided into four major types: (1) the hypothesis is accepted (as presumably true) in accordance with the rule and is in fact true; (2) the hypothesis is rejected (as presumably false) in accordance with the rule and is in fact false; (3) the hypothesis is accepted in accordance with the rule, but is in fact false; (4) the hypothesis is rejected in accordance with the rule but is in fact true.
The former two cases are what science aims to achieve; the possibility 4. My thanks to Eric Angner for bringing this article to my attention.
of the latter two represents the inductive risk that any acceptance rule must involve. (1965, 92) In order to formulate the acceptance rules properly, Hempel suggests, one must decide how one values the various outcomes: "The problem of formulating adequate rules of acceptance and rejection has no clear meaning unless standards of adequacy have been provided by assigning definite values or disvalues to those different possible 'outcomes' of acceptance or rejection." (1965, 92) It is in this way that value statements act as legitimate premises in whether or not to accept or reject a scientific hypothesis.
Values are needed to weigh the consequences of the possible errors one makes in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, i.e., the consequences that follow from the inductive risk.
Depending on the outcomes, different kinds of values will be required for the justification of an acceptance rule. For some cases, acceptance (or rejection) of a hypothesis will lead to a particular course of action and outcomes with non-epistemic effects. In these cases, the outcomes of the potential actions need to be evaluated using non-epistemic values in order to formulate rules of acceptance. In other cases, where the acceptance of a hypothesis will not lead clearly to any particular course of action, Hempel believes the question of how to assign values to the outcomes to be considerably more difficult.5 Instead of valuing the practical outcomes, one must instead consider the outcomes in terms of the goals of science, which Hempel describes as "the attainment of an increasingly reliable, extensive, and theoretically systematized body of knowledge." (1965, 93) In current terms, Hempel is providing a potential set of epistemic values with which to determine what our rules of acceptance ought to be: reliability, extensiveness, and systematization.6
Although inductive risk is present in scientists' decisions to accept a theory, it is not obvious that scientists should consider all the consequences entailed by inductive risk. One might argue, as both Richard Jeffrey and Ernan McMullin have, that we should not expect or demand that scientists consider the consequences of accepting a theory erroneously. (Jeffrey 1956; McMullin 1983 ) Such considerations, McMullin argued in his 1982 Presidential Address to the Philosophy of Science Association, should be made by those using or applying the science. Under this view, the value judgments attached to various outcomes, or "utilities," are not the concern of the scientists. As McMullin stated: "Such utilities are irrelevant to theoretical science proper and the scientist is not called upon 5. A point made by Jeffrey (1956, 242) .
6. Levi (1962) emphasized the use of epistemic values to the exclusion of all others.
to make value-judgments in their regard as part of his scientific work." (McMullin 1983, 8) This argument, however, overlooks the authority science and scientists have in our culture and the important role scientists play in practical decision-making. Where science is "useful" it will have effects beyond the development of a body of knowledge. (Longino 1990, 85-86) In these cases where inductive risk is involved, non-epistemic values are not the sole determinant of whether to accept a given option. The scientist will need to consider both the quantity of evidence or degree of confirmation to estimate the magnitude of inductive risk and the valuation of the consequences that would result from error to estimate the seriousness or desirability of the consequences. The weighing of these consequences, in combination with the perceived magnitude of the inductive risk (i.e., how likely one is to be wrong), determines which choice is more acceptable. Where non-epistemic consequences follow from error, non-epistemic values are essential for deciding which inductive risks we should accept, or which choice we should make. In laboratory animal studies, tests for statistical significance are used to determine when the response of the dosed or exposed animals is significantly different from the non-dosed or control animals. Because of the control exerted in the lab over the conditions of the animals, if there is a response that is significantly different between the exposed and the control animals, that difference can generally be attributed to the dose given to the animals. The statistical comparison between exposed and control ani-9. In Regulating Toxic Substances, Carl Cranor argues that the standard assumptions have not been serving us well, leaving us with too many false negatives compared to false positives. He estimates that false negatives are in fact more costly to society than false positives. (see Cranor 1993, 71-78, 122-129, 135-137, and 153-157) mals is particularly important for cancer studies, where both control animals and exposed animals will usually exhibit some cancer. What must be determined is whether the exposed animals exhibit significantly more cancer than the control animals. Only when a cancer rate is significantly different from the control cancer rate is it considered a genuine result of the dosing. Thus, setting the standard for statistical significance will impact what is considered a response caused by the dosing. The stricter the standards for statistical significance, the greater the difference between dosed animals and control animals will need to be for the response to be considered significant. Stricter standards lead to a reduction in the rate of false positives, and an increase in the rate of false negatives. On the other hand, if one has a laxer standard for statistical significance, a smaller difference in cancer rates between exposed and control populations will be considered significant and attributed to the dosing regimen. This increases the likelihood of false positives, but lowers the likelihood of false negatives.
In setting the standard for statistical significance, one must decide what balance between false positives and false negatives is optimal. In making this decision, one ought to consider the consequences of the false positives and false negatives, both epistemic and non-epistemic. I will focus here on the non-epistemic consequences. In laboratory animal studies testing the potential harms of environmentally pervasive chemicals (such as dioxins), the results are used to determine both whether the chemical has a particular effect and what the dose-response relationship is for the chemical and the effect. The results are then extrapolated to humans (a controversial subject I will not address here) and used to set regulatory standards for the chemical.
In testing whether dioxins have a particular effect or not, an excess of false positives in such studies will mean that dioxins will appear to cause more harm to the animals than they actually do, leading to overregulation of the chemicals. An excess of false negatives will have the opposite result, causing dioxins to appear less harmful than they actually are, leading to underregulation of the chemicals. Thus, in general, false positives are likely to lead to stronger regulation than is warranted (or overregulation); false negatives are likely to lead to weaker regulation than is warranted (or underregulation). Overregulation presents excess costs to the industries that would bear the costs of regulations. Underregulation presents costs to public health and to other areas affected by damage to public health. Depending on how one values these effects, an evaluation that requires the consultation of non-epistemic values, different balances between false positives and false negatives will be preferable.
In addition to whether a substance has a particular effect, laboratory animal studies also are used to determine the dose-response relationship for the effect. Two different models are used when interpreting dose- For the threshold model, the no-response level is determined by where there is no statistically significant response, i.e., the threshold is defined in terms of observable response and observability is defined in terms of statistical significance. Thus a false negative generally means that the "safe" dose is set higher than it should be, which will be less protective of public health. Because dose levels in animal studies are usually set one order of magnitude apart, the "safe dose" resulting from a false negative will be at least one order of magnitude less protective than it should be. For a doseresponse extrapolation curve, a false negative will have varied results, depending on the shape of the curve, but it will in general produce a less dangerous looking curve, leading to laxer regulations. False positives, on the other hand, will produce excessively protective safe doses (in the threshold model) or more dangerous looking dose-response curves (in the extrapolation model), generating stricter than necessary regulation.
In finding the appropriate balance between false positive and false negative errors, we must decide what the appropriate balance is in the consequences of those errors: overregulation and underregulation. Selecting an appropriate balance will depend on how we value the effects of those two consequences, whether we are more concerned about protecting public health from dioxin pollution or whether we are more concerned about protecting industries that produce dioxins from increased regulation. To value one objective and not to value the other at all does not seem to be a plausible position; we would not want to choose to have only false positives or only false negatives. Finding the balance requires, among other things, weighing the non-epistemic valuations of the potential consequences.
Reducing the possibility of any error by increasing the power of the study would help mitigate the dilemma here, but doing so is extremely A single two-year cancer study using 200 rats (50 at three dose levels and 50 controls) costs roughly $3 million. (Graham and Rhomberg 1996, 18) The cost and logistics of increased dose groups can be overwhelming.
Perhaps some other solutions to strengthen studies will present itself, but in the meantime, some balance must be struck. Where the balance should lie for dioxin studies is currently unclear. Regardless, determining the balance clearly requires an ethical value judgment in the internal stages of a scientific study. In dioxin cancer studies, rodents (the animal group of choice because of their relatively short lifespan and rapid breeding cycles) are dosed for two years, close to a natural life-span. At the end of those two years, full body autopsies are performed on the animals to gather the endpoint data.
Inductive Risk in Evidence Characterization
Because dioxins appear to affect more than one organ site, all potential areas for cancerous growths are checked. In the studies relied upon by regulators for making decisions about dioxins, tissue and organ samples have been mounted on slides to be evaluated by toxicologists. One particular study, published in 1978 by Richard Kociba and other toxicologists at Dow Chemical, has been central to regulators in setting acceptable levels for dioxins in the environment. (Greenlee et al. 1991, 567; Huff et al. 1991, 72) The first long term cancer study performed for dioxins, the Kociba study focused attention on cancers of the liver in female rats.
( Kociba et al. 1978) The female rat liver slides have undergone at least three evaluations by pathologists, with different results.
In Table 1 , three different evaluations of the rat liver slides from the Kociba studies are given. The first evaluation, from 1978, was originally The third slide evaluation in 1990 was precipitated by a reconsideration of the understanding and evaluation of rat liver changes. In the mid-1980s, the basic categories for rat liver anomalies came into question and a new system was put into place that was supposed to add clarity to rat liver abnormality evaluations. (Maronpot et al. 1986 ) Yet when these new standards were used by the seven pathologists in the 1990 re-evaluation, agreement was not readily achieved on how the various abnormalities should be classified. The seven experts resorted to majority voting to reach an opinion about the slides. (The article describing the voting claimed that ''consensus was reached when at least four out of seven pathologists agreed." (Goodman and Sauer 1992) This is not a consensus as normally understood, but a simple majority.) That the pathologists resorted to vot-ing indicates that there is still a significant degree of judgment required in the evaluation of the rat liver slides. Even with the new standards, how the standards are to be implemented is viewed differently among experts.
As evidenced by the lack of agreement among expert pathologists, the judgment of whether a tissue sample has a cancerous lesion or not has proven to be more subtle than one might initially suppose. Thus, for a slide evaluation, there is significant uncertainty in whether a judgment is correct. With this uncertainty comes significant inductive risk and the need to evaluate consequences of potential errors. Although not as formal as setting a level for statistical significance, the pathologists must be similarly concerned with false positives and false negatives. Suppose a pathologist chooses to take all borderline cases and judge them to be non-cancerous lesions. Such an approach will insure few false positives, but will likely lead to several false negatives. The consequences for such an approach will be an underestimation of malignancies and thus an underestimation of risk. Because the Kociba studies have been so important in regulation, a lowered estimate of risk arising from a reinterpretation of the studies will likely lead to a relaxed regulation (as the 1990 reevaluation did in the state of Maine). (Brown 1991, 17) If the regulation has been lowered on the basis of erroneous judgments (false negatives), then the lowered regulation may cause increased harm to the public. In choosing to judge all borderline cases as non-cancerous, the pathologists must judge this an acceptable risk.
Another pathologist may take a different approach, judging all borderline cases to be malignancies. This approach, in contrast, will reduce false negatives, but will likely produce several false positives. Such false positives will increase the apparent rate of malignancies in the rats, thus increasing the appearance of risk. For a data set as important as the Kociba studies, such a (false) appearance would lead to a more stringent (than necessary) regulation. Although choosing to judge borderline cases as malignancies will more amply protect public health, the approach does so at the economic costs of potentially unnecessary regulation. When pathologists view the slides, borderline cases will occur (as evidenced by the lack of agreement among pathologists). Some judgments must be made by the pathologists regarding how to classify the liver slides. Depending on how one values these consequences of false positives and false negatives, one would want to make questionable judgments in favor of one direction or another.
One might argue that blinding the pathologists to which dose groups the slides belong could alleviate the need to consider the consequences of the errors in judgment. If pathologists have a tendency towards avoiding false positives and thus produce more false negatives (or vice versa) but distribute that tendency evenly among control and dosed slides, then the difference between control and dosed slides will be roughly the same (assuming the number of borderline slides in each group is the same). In addition, the consequences of errors on particular slides cannot be determined if one doesn't know to which dose group the slide belongs, thus shielding individual judgments from such consequences. Such blinding techniques are particularly useful to prevent the unacceptable direct use of non-epistemic values in the characterization of data, i.e., the seeing of something because one wants to see it. The argument that one ought to consider the consequences of error in making judgments should not be construed as an argument against blinding techniques used to prevent blatant errors. However, before such blinding techniques are used, one should be sure to consider how successful they will be in a particular case (whether there are other clues that will offset the blinding) and whether potential errors will be distributed evenly among study groups. If the chance of errors is not distributed evenly among study groups, one is still required to consider inductive risk, because the consequences of error are foreseeable. For example, if borderline cases are likely to be found only in dosed groups, then false positives or false negatives will have predictable consequences.
In the dioxin rat liver case, complete blinding is not possible with these slides. At the two higher dose levels, signs of acute liver toxicity were also visible in the slides, signs with which the pathologists are familiar. Thus, the two higher dose levels are identifiable through the microscope which pathologists use to examine the slides for cancerous lesions. And it is in these higher dose levels (10 ng/kg/day and 100 nglkg/day) that the most cancerous growths were found and the most borderline cases were observed and evaluated. Thu's, the pathologists were aware of the nonepistemic consequences of their decisions in categorizing the slides. They are thus required to consider those consequences using non-epistemic values when making the judgment call on how to categorize the slides. This case demonstrates that there is inductive risk in how one applies categories used in data characterization and that such inductive risk can be linked to non-epistemic consequences. A tendency to either overestimate or underestimate the number of cancerous growths in these slides will have an impact on how dangerous dioxins appear. The consequences of the errors are identifiable and need to be weighed in order to determine which errors are more acceptable. In other cases, inductive risk may be present in the selection of the categories to be used as well as the application of the categories in the characterization of the data. In addition, judgments are made in science concerning whether to keep data or whether to discard the data as unreliable. At all these decision points, there is the risk of error, and with that risk, the need to consider both the epistemic and non-epistemic consequences of error. Two opposing general background assumptions lay the groundwork for the arguments over whether there is a threshold for dioxins' carcinogenic effects. For the endpoint of cancer, two competing basic assumptions 10. "Most sensitive endpoint" means that if you regulate to prevent or acceptably reduce risk from that endpoint (e.g., cancer), all other toxic effects will also be adequately prevented. Whether cancer is the most sensitive endpoint for dioxins is a matter of debate.
in toxicology are plausible: that there is always a threshold for toxic effects and that there is no safe dose or threshold for carcinogenic effects. On one side, one can argue that a threshold for toxic effects should be the basic assumption. For toxicologists in general, one of the first maxims is "the dose determines the poison." Or as Paracelsus said more eloquently: "All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right dose differentiates a poison and a remedy." (as quoted in Timbrell 1989, 9) Under this view, it is generally assumed that every poison has some threshold for its toxic effects; nothing is biologically potent at every dose.
The opposing basic assumption, that no threshold exists, arises from work on cancer formation, particularly cancer due to radiation. In the 1960s, scientists came to understand that a tumor could arise from just one mutant cell, and a mutant cell could arise from just one stray hit of radiation (e.g., one beta or alpha particle). For cancer caused by radiation, therefore, the dose does not determine the poison. Any amount of radiation, no matter how small, has the ability to cause cancer. It just isn't likely. Instead, a cell damaged by radiation is more likely to self-destruct, or to be destroyed by the immune system, if the cell threatens uncontrolled cancerous growth. But there is no threshold for radiation's ability to produce cancer. One then needs to have a curve of the likelihood of cancer plotted against the dose. An acceptable dose is determined not by a threshold but by what risk one is willing to take. This no-threshold model for radiation's carcinogenic effects has been adopted by U.S. regulatory agencies for chemicals that are mutagenic, as evidenced by the use of no threshold linear extrapolation model by agencies when performing risk assessments for mutagenic chemicals. A mutagenic chemical is one that can damage the DNA such that cancerous cells result. Mutagenic chemicals are thought to act in roughly the same way as radiation; and thus it is thought that no dose of a mutagen is "safe," just as with radiation. One is either above or below an acceptable risk level, currently set at 1 in 1,000,000 lifetime cancer risk.
These two opposing intuitions on whether there is a threshold in the dose-response curves of cancer-causing chemicals are complicated by the fact that not all cancer causing chemicals are mutagens. Some chemicals do not damage or alter the DNA, but instead promote the growth of cancerous cells once the mutations are already present. In lab tests, these chemicals will not promote cancer on their own. One must first place a mutagen into the cell culture. Then, the addition of the promoter greatly increases the incidence of cancer compared with the mutagen alone. Dioxin appears to be a very potent promoter of cancer in this way, while not being mutagenic. For the remainder of this discussion, I will assume that dioxin is a promoter only and not a mutagen. It is unclear whether we should assume that such promoters have thresholds similar to other toxic effects or that they are more like mutagens, with no threshold for their potential damage, only decreasing likelihood with decreasing dose. Which general background assumption, that toxins always have thresholds or that carcinogens do not, should be adopted in the dioxin case, is open for debate.
Against this backdrop of competing general assumptions, interpretations more specific to the dioxin case must be made. The Kociba female rat liver data, discussed in the previous section, has been central to debates over a threshold in dioxin's cancer promoting ability. Recall from the discussion above that three separate evaluations have been made of the female rat liver slides from the Kociba study. Regardless of which evaluation one chooses to consider reliable, there appears to be a significant increase in tumor rates among the rats given 10-100 ng/kg/day, whereas the animals given 1 ng/kg/day do not have a response significantly different from the control animals. (See Table 1 .) Is this data evidence that there is a threshold in the ability of dioxins to produce cancer in rats? Depending on which aspects of the data one chooses to emphasize and which assumptions one adopts, different interpretations arise.
For those critical of the threshold interpretation, the issue of the statistical power of the studies is crucial. The sample size for the Kociba rat liver slides is 50 female rats at each dose level. If the dose level of 1 ng/ kg/day produces cancer in 1% more of the dosed rats than the control rats, this study will not be able to detect that effect. A one in one hundred effect is not statistically detectable in the sample size of 50 rats. And whether an effect is "observed" is determined by whether an effect is statistically significant.11 Thus, a 1% increase in cancer rate is not observable in the Kociba study. Suppose dosing the rats at 1 ng/kg/day causes an elevation in the cancer rate to this small degree. Then the "threshold" is only in our ability to observe the effects given our limited resources (only 50 female rats); it represents a limit of detection, not a limit in the activity of dioxins.
It is not a threshold that can be relied upon by the regulators, who must be concerned with the 1% and even lower chance effects, when applied across a human population of millions. In sum, if there is a threshold, and that threshold is at a dose which produces fairly high rates of responses, then the threshold should be easily detectable. For example, if there is a threshold for effects and at that threshold, 10% or more of the animals will be affected, we should be able to detect this in a Kociba-type study.
If, on the other hand, the threshold is a low probability threshold, we 11. Choice of a level for statistical significance is discussed above. In these studies, "significant" results must be significant to the 95% level, i.e., the false positive rate will be 5% or less.
won't be able to detect this with such a study. If there is no threshold, we won't be able to detect this with such a study either.
While the relatively weak statistical power of the animal studies lends support to the no-threshold interpretation, other aspects of the study bolster the threshold model. One crucial argument arises from the possibility that the rat liver tumors were caused not by dioxin tumor promotion directly, but indirectly through dioxin's acute toxic effects to the liver. As argued recently in the rat liver slide evaluation debate, the increase in liver cancer rates among the female rats could be due to the acute toxicity dioxin causes in the liver, which results in cell death in the liver, forcing the liver to attempt a rapid regeneration of cells. (Brown 1991; Goodman and Sauer 1992) Table 1 , far right column.)
Liver toxicity is generally thought to be a threshold effect, following the classic toxicology intuition that a dose determines the poison for such acute toxic effects. If one considers the liver toxicity to be a threshold effect and if the cancer found in rat livers is merely a by-product of that toxicity, it would be reasonable to presume that there is a threshold for dioxin's cancer promoting ability in the rat livers. Under this line of reasoning, one could argue that the threshold for cancers should be placed just above the level where liver toxicity ceases, i.e., that no increased risk of cancer occurs at the dose of 1 ng/kg/day. If liver toxicity causes the cancer, and is not simply concurrent with it, the cancer promotion in the liver is plausibly a threshold effect. On the other hand, one might argue that the acute liver toxicity, while perhaps assisting dioxin's tumor promoting abilities, is not the cause of the cancer. Instead, one could argue that dioxin's tumor promoting abilities are separate from the acute liver damage, pointing to evidence that dioxin promotes tumors in other animals organs as well.
In sum, one can present two opposing and plausible interpretations of the Kociba rat liver data, depending on one's choice of background assumptions and emphasis. The background assumptions that lead to the threshold position include that the toxicity seen in the livers is a likely cause of the cancers and that such cancer promotion is likely to be a threshold phenomenon, making it more plausible that an apparent threshold in the data is an actual threshold. The background assumptions that lead to the opposing viewpoint include that the statistical sensitivity of the studies is not sufficient to detect a threshold and that the link between toxicity and cancer promotion is correlation but not necessarily causation. countries, such as the U.S., that have relied on non-threshold extrapolation models. (Finkel 1988; Greenlee et al. 1991 ) If one adopts a threshold model and one is wrong, the regulations will likely be inadequately protective of public health. If one adopts a non-threshold model and one is wrong, the regulations will likely be overly stringent. How one values these two possible errors should play an important role in determining which inductive risk one is more willing to take, and thus which assumptions one is more willing to adopt. Instead, it is through the consideration of the consequences of error. This means that not all scientific decisions in the internal stages of science will require the consultation of non-epistemic values. When there is very low uncertainty, such that a scientist believes there is virtually no chance of being wrong, there is little gained by considering the consequences of being wrong the chance of error is so small that consequences of being wrong become insignificant. This parallels everyday thinking, where, for example, the chance of being struck by a meteorite is so small, it is not worth considering the consequences of such an event. Nor does understanding the importance of inductive risk mean that scientists should cease to attempt to reduce the chance of error. If anything, it should increase that motivation.
In addition, there are some areas of science where making a wrong choice has no impact on anything outside of that area of research. One may think, for example, of research into the coherence properties of atom beams.12 It is very difficult to fathom how errors in such research could have non-epistemic consequences. Hence, scientists doing such research need not consider non-epistemic values. However, this type of research is rapidly becoming a minority in modern science, as most funding goes toward "applied" research, and funding that goes toward "basic" research 12. I thank my colleague at the University of Puget Sound, Greg Elliott, for this example.
increasingly needs to justify itself in terms of some eventual applicability or use.
Finally, there are cases where the science will likely be useful but the potential consequences of error may be difficult to foresee. This gray area would have to be debated case by case, but the fact that such a gray area exists does not negate the basic argument: when non-epistemic consequences of error can be foreseen, non-epistemic values are a necessary part of scientific reasoning. What this means for the "objectivity" of science must await future work. As a closing comment, it must be noted however, that, as Hempel pointed out, the argument "I want X to be true, therefore X is true" remains a bad argument, both within and without science.
